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LANGUAGE AND INTERNAL STATES  : 
A LONG DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY 
AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF FUNCTIONING
:YnKZcZo^Vcd
MoDyCo · Université Paris Descartes · Xcgh, Paris, France
6WhigVXi  : Children start taking into account and talking about internal states in the second 
part of  the second year when they begin referring more generally to decontextualized, non perceptible 
and subjective aspects of  experience. This is a very important milestone in children’s socio-commu-
nicative development, showing fundamental emerging abilities in practical “theory of  mind” (ToM). 
It is however, only a !rst step of  a long developmental process that takes place as the child deals with 
activities and levels of  increasing complexity.
This paper presents evidence by which children provide !rst signs of  implicit comprehension of  
their interlocutors’ internal states through nonverbal behaviors and through informative uses of  lan-
guage. Then, the emergence of  talking about and taking into account inernal states is analyzed 
concomitantly in the longitudinal study of  one French-acquiring child followed between the ages of  
&* and ', months. These data consist in naturally-occurring interactions videorecorded at the child’s 
home. Results show that emotional and intentional states precede taking into account the partner’s 
epistemic states (informative uses of  language) which, in turn, precede talking about them.
Then, drawing on narrative data from * to &%-year-old children, it will be shown that internal state 
talk presents new challenges as children work at higher levels of  explicitness and complexity, as the 
internal states draw on beliefs, and as this talk needs to be integrated into a multidimensional cogni-
tive activity such as the construction of  a coherent story out of  a sequence of  images.
@ZnldgYh  : Internal states reference - Conversation - Narratives - Theory of  mind - Levels of  func-
tioning.
>cigdYjXi^dc
0ciZgcVa state talk manifests children’s ability to focus on what is psychological rather then overtly perceptible, which is the site of  hidden but most powerful 
sources of  human beings’ behavior, and is very closely related to what has come to 
be called “mind-mindedness” (Meins et al. '%%() : an attitude to see others as men-
tal and intentional beings whose behavior can be explained and predicted by their 
internal, psychological states. These capacities are complex and diverse. They de-
velop from early infancy into late school-age years (e.g., Astington '%%+ ; Chandler 
'%%&) and in no way can they be reduced to children’s performance in test-like situ-
ations construed on the blueprint of  the False Belief  paradigm (Wimmer, Perner 
&.-(). Language reveals children’s capacity in mind-mindness (MM) and in theory 
of  mind (ToM). One domain that is often studied is children’s explicit reference to 
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internal states. However, talking about internal states is not the only way children 
can use language to show mind-mindedness in communicative contexts. Without 
necessarily using internal state vocabulary, children show that they can take into 
account their interlocutors’ psychological states (intention-desires, emotional and/
or epistemic) by the way they use language in interacting with them. Examples of  
early uses of  informative language are captured by the way children start express-
ing particular kinds of  speech acts (for example, how they request, manifest their 
opposition or talk about past events, e.g., Dunn &..& ; Eisenberg &.-* ; Veneziano, 
Sinclair &..*), or by considering which contents are expressed and how they are 
talked about (Allen '%%, ; Matthews, Lieven, Theakston, Tomasello '%%+).
It might be supposed that taking into account others’ internal states is simpler 
than talking about them. Drawing from longitudinal data relating the early expres-
sion of  internal states to di!erent kinds of  informative uses of  language in the 
same child, it will be shown that these two expressions of  MM appear early and 
are closely related in development. For both skills, these are "rst steps in a long 
developmental process taking place as the child deals with activities and levels of  
increasing complexity. Drawing from studies of  * to &%-year olds’ narratives, it will 
be shown that taking into account others’ internal states and talking about them pres-
ent new challenges as children function at higher levels of  awareness, explicitness, 
and complexity of  the language means, as internal states bear on beliefs, and the 
communicative contexts require the integration of  multiple skills.
Thus, in what follows, evidence pointing to developments in taking into account 
and in talking about internal states will be presented by drawing on research studies 
dealing with two developmental periods : &. early development, centered on & to 
(-year-old children ; '. later development, focused on * to &%-year-old children. The 
particularly revealing uses of  language analyzed will indicate that ToM capacities 
are multifaceted and develop over time, emerging early and continuing to develop 
well after success in False Belief  tasks.
&#HijY^Zhd[ZVganYZkZadebZci
&. &. Taking into account others’ internal states : !rst signs of  implicit comprehension
Preverbal and nonverbal behaviors strongly suggest that children take into account 
intentional and knowledge states of  their interlocutors rather early. Demands for 
attention and the capacity to share a common referent with a partner have been 
considered to manifest, at a very intuitive and implicit level, a sensitivity to the fact 
that the attentional states of  the partner are di!erent from their own and need to 
be directed (e.g., Tomasello &..*). Studies of  “social referencing” have shown that 
one year olds can take into account the emotional states of  relevant others and 
draw the appropriate consequences for their own behavior. Thus, the mothers’ 
“happy face” make babies cross the “Visual Cli! ” (Gibson, Walk &.+%), whereas 
only few babies cross it if  she presents a fearful expression (Sorce, Emde, Campos, 
Klinnert &.-*). Babies are also more likely to play with a new toy if  their mother 
expresses positive emotions towards it (e.g., Klinnert &.-) ; Walden, Ogan &.--). 
At &- months, they can give the experimenter the food she likes, even if  this is not 
what the child likes for herself  (Repacholi, Gopnik &..,), suggesting that they can 
make the di!erence between their own desires and preferences, and those of  an-
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other person. Around ' years children seem to take into account also the states of  
knowledge of  their partner. Children ask for a hidden object di!erently depending 
on whether the mother was present or absent from the room at the time of  hiding 
(O’Neill &..+), or draw the mother’s attention to an object di!erently depending 
on whether the object was in view for both the mother and the child or only for 
the child (Franco '%%&). Furthermore, within a “False belief ” paradigm, &* month-
olds look longer at an actor searching the object at the place that corresponds to 
the state of  the world rather than to the actor’s belief  (as if  they were surprised) 
(Onishi, Baillargeon '%%*).
The accumulation of  this type of  results provide increasing evidence in favor of  
an interpretation by which children, at the beginning of  their second year, start 
taking into account the attentional, intentional and emotional states of  their part-
ners, and somewhat later also their knowledge states. However, some of  these 
implicit signs of  MM allow for alternative, lower level interpretations (see, for ex-
ample, Baldwin, &..*, for an alternative interpretation of  social referencing).
&. '. Taking into account others’ internal states : the emergence and early development 
of  “informative” language uses
When children start acquiring language they have at their disposal a set of  inten-
tional and variegated means of  communication allowing them to go further in 
the manifestation of  implicit understanding of  others’ internal states. On the one 
hand, because of  its representational aspect, language allows to go beyond the here 
and now, to talk about absent objects and persons, past events as well as subjec-
tive aspects of  experience, going from internal states to providing explanations or 
justi"cations of  events. In this way, language is used informatively as it provides to 
interlocutors information they don’t have or make them “aware of  something of  
which they were not previously aware” (Lyons &.,, : (().
On the other hand, when children acquire more varied linguistic means, it is not 
only what is talked about but also how. Referents can be presented linguistically 
as a function of  their accessibility to the interlocutor, in the immediate context 
or in the previous discourse (Ariel '%%&). To function adequately, children do not 
only need to have the ability to assess whether the interlocutor is already familiar 
with a particular referent, but also to know which linguistic means vehiculate the 
cognitive status of  a referent in discourse (e.g., the use of  de"nite or inde"nite de-
terminers, or the use of  pronouns) (Ariel '%%& ; Gundel, Hedberg, Zacharski &..(). 
Studies of  everyday conversations in natural setting suggest that children may start 
to have both abilities in their third year of  life, or at least by ( years. Children in-
troduce referents as a function of  their accessibility to the partner : new referents 
are referred to with lexical items while more accessible referents are omitted or 
referred to with a pronoun or an a#xal form (Allen, '%%, ; Guerriero, Oshima-
Takane, Kuriyama '%%+). Also, under more controlled conditions, ( to )-year-old 
children choose di!erent referring expressions (noun vs. pronoun) depending on 
whether their interlocutor can see the intended referent or has already mentioned 
it in previous discourse (Matthews et al. '%%+).
In what follows we will concentrate on the very emergence of  informative lan-
guage uses through the analysis of  what children verbalize and of  the new commu-
nicative functions ful"lled by lexical items known to them.
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&. '. &. Informative language to persuade : the provision of  justi"cations
In the second part of  the second year, children start using their single-word ut-
terances to provide justi"cation of  their behavior (Veneziano, Sinclair &..*). For 
example, at & ;+.'', Camille gives a bottle, which still contains some juice, to her 
mother and says /py/, plus, ‘no more’. The function of  this verbalization is not 
that of  mistakingly stating that there is no more juice in the bottle, but to pro-
vide the reason or the justi"cation for handing the still half-"lled bottle to her 
mother. When explaining or justifying, speakers present their interlocutor the 
links they have constructed in their mind between events, actions and/or utter-
ances, links that are not directly accessible to another person even if  the objects 
and events talked about are present at the time of  speaking. Talking about them 
informs the interlocutor about those links and exempli"es an “informative use” 
of  language.
The appearance of  justi"cations and the change in the way ordinary speech acts 
are expressed can be particularly well demonstrated by following developmentally 
children’s expression of  requests and oppositions. These interactive situations ap-
pear early in development and each occurrence constitute an opportunity for justi-
"cations to appear. Thus, absence of  the latter in these contexts cannot be simply 
reduced to sampling limitations.
The data presented here concern the longitudinal studies of  four normally de-
veloping children, three girls and one boy, acquiring French. The children were 
observed in their home environment every two weeks during spontaneous inter-
action with their caregiver, mostly the mother, in a variety of  naturally occurring 
situations. At the beginning of  the study the children were aged between & ;( and 
& ;* ; at the end of  the study, between & ;- and ' ;(. The data concern a total of  *% 
hours of  recorded interaction whose transcriptions have been lately updated to 
CHILDES conventions and linked to the videotapes.
When using language to express a request, for a certain period, children verbal-
ize one or another of  the di!erent aspects of  a request, e.g. the desired object (/∫õ/ 
for bouchon, ‘bottle cap’, while reaching out towards the mother who held a bottle 
cap), the desired result (/ecru/ for trou, ‘hole’, while handing a punching machine 
and a piece of  paper to the mother), the “agent”, the person who has to perform 
the action (e.g. /mamã/ ,’mommy’, while handing a spinning top to the mother) 
or the action that should be carried out to obtain the desired object or result (for 
example, /ovi / for ouvrir ‘open’, while handing a box containing baby dolls to the 
mother). At some point a new behavior appears : instead of  verbalizing one of  the 
request components, children provide the reason for the request while expressing 
the request gesturally. In the following example, the child doesn’t say what she 
wants from the father but lets him know verbally the reason for making the request, 
whose essential components (agent and object) are communicated via gestures :
Example &. A child, aged & ;+, interacting with her father in her home environment.
After having tried to open a box containing the pieces of  a puzzle, the child hands the box 
to her father while saying /pe’pa/ (‘peux pas’, ‘can’t’).
Similarly, for quite some time, when verbalizing the refusal to carry out a request, 
to protest an action, or to disagree with a statement, children act and gesture in a 
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negative manner, say ‘no’ or both. Then, manifestations of  oppositions start to be 
followed by a justi"cation as in examples ' and ( below :
Example '. A child, aged & ;+, interacting with her mother in her home environment.
The child refuses mother’s help to open a box saying non (no) and immediately afterwards, 
while looking at her mother before resuming her activity, adds /tusel/, toute seule (all by 
myself ).
Example (.  A child, aged ' ;', interacting with her mother in her home environment.
Mother :  toi tu la lis pas l’histoire ?  you, you don’t read the story ?
Child :  non epa ‘non ( je) sais pas’ (no, (I) don’t know)
Mother : tu sais pas ?  you don’t know ?
Child : shakes negatively her head
Mother : starts reading the story herself
With their ‘no’, children express what they do not want to do but with their justi-
"cations they let their partner know the reason for their refusal, rendering it more 
understandable and thus more likely to be accepted. Clearly, these justi"cations 
are still primitive and become more elaborate later (e.g., Eisenberg, Garvey &.-& ; 
Tesla, Dunn &..' ; Haight, Garvey, Masiello &..*). However, like the later justi"ca-
tions, they also tend to persuade the partner who is likely to accept the child’s 
viewpoint, often immediately afterwards (e.g., Dunn, Munn &.-, ; Tesla, Dunn 
&..' ; Haight et al. &..*, Veneziano '%%&).
Precise results on the change in the way requests and refusals are expressed dur-
ing early language acquisition are presented in IVWaZ &.
IVWaZ &. Number of  children’s Requests and Oppositions and proportion of  justi"cations 
of  these speech acts, by child and age.
Requests and refusals occur at all observational sessions. These acts are never jus-
ti"ed until a certain time period when at least some justi"cations occur in these 
contexts at each session. For example, between & ;( and & ;, Camille expressed -' 
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requests and *' refusals or denials, none of  them justi"ed. Instead, between & ;- and 
& ;&%, (*% of  the )* requests and +-% of  the '' oppositional episodes were justi"ed. 
The age at which children start providing justi"cations of  one or another of  these 
two speech acts varies. Chantal is the "rst of  the four children to provide justi"ca-
tions (at & ;+), while Gael is the last (at & ;.). The appearance of  these justi"cations is 
not due to the children’s acquisition of  new lexical items since, before using them as 
justi"cations, children already knew at least some of  these words (Veneziano, Sin-
clair, &..*). This change is believed to occur when children start to take into account 
more actively the di!erence between their own and their partner’s internal states.
&. '. '. Informative language to talk about the past
Though children might occasionally talk about past events when they ‘talk for 
themselves’ (cf. Piaget, &.)*/&.+', observation no.&%)), relating past events aims 
to provide new information to an interlocutor who was not present or to focus 
the partner’s attention on particular aspects of  shared past experience. Studies of  
mother-child conversations show that children’s references to past make their ap-
pearance in the second part of  the second year (Eisenberg &.-* ; Lucariello, Nelson 
&.-, ; Miller, Sperry &.-- ; Veneziano, Sinclair &..*). Example ) shows an early joint 
narration initially sca!olded by the mother :
Example ). A child, aged & ;., interacting with her mother in her home environment
Mother and child are looking at a picturebook
Mother&  :  tu te souviens quand on était au bord du lac ?
  ‘do you remember when we were at the lakeshore ?’
Child& :  ulac 
  ‘ulake'
Mother' :  à qui t’avais donné du pain ?
  ‘to whom you gave bread ?’
Child' :  upain # usiH
  ‘ubread # uswan'
Mother( :  t’avais donné du pain aux cygnes ?
  ‘you gave bread to the swans ?’
Child( :  nh (nodding)
Child) :  udwa # usiH
  ‘u"nger # uswan'
Mother) :  les doigts, t’avais peur qu’ils te mordent les doigts les cygnes ?
  ‘the "ngers, you were afraid that they bite your "ngers the swan ?’
Child* :  usiH# udwa
  ‘uswan # u"nger'
In the above example, the mother initiates the narrative by soliciting the child’s 
memory (Mother&) and the child follows with a simple uptake of  the last item 
of  her utterance (Child&). The mother’s ensuing question (Mother') is followed 
by an appropriate answer (Child') and a mutual con"rmation sequence (Mother(, 
Child(). Then, the child brings the mother’s attention on a new piece of  infor-
mation (Child)), interpreted and shared in the following two turns (Mother) and 
Child*).
Analyses of  children’s contributions to conversations about the past, concerning 
the same children for whom results on the appearance of  explanations have been 
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reported above, show that the "rst clear, non imitative, references to aspects of  
past events (like contributions in Child' and Child) in example ) above) occur be-
tween & ;+ and & ;.. As it can be seen in IVWaZ ', between ((% and ,&% of  these clear 
contributions were o!ered by the children without any solicitation by the adult.
IVWaZ '. Number of  children’s clear and spontaneous references to past events, and % 
occurring in child-initiated themes, by child and age.
Children start talking about the past quite early but not as soon as their lexicon or 
their memories would allow it. As for justi"cations, also this change suggests that 
children, as they become more competent cognitively and socially, use language to 
highlight what is relevant for their listener (Sachs &.-( : '&), manifesting that they 
start to take into account the internal states, at least of  their immediate interlocutor.
&. '. ( Language in pretend play : informing and sharing
The aspects of  pretend play that children verbalize while playing provide another 
early source of  evidence on children’s ability to take into account other people’s 
knowledge states. We are not talking here about the fact that language is interwo-
ven into pretend play and that it contributes to create, complexify and organize it 
(Fein &.-& ; Garvey &..% ; Musatti, Veneziano, Mayer &..-). We are talking about the 
communicative component of  language in this particular setting. Indeed, given 
the subjective nature of  pretense, the intended meanings of  the child’s play are not 
necessarily evident for an interested partner. From a communicative point of  view, 
it is their verbalization that often provides the determining information to access 
the child’s pretend meanings, particularly when the actions, objects and gestures 
are not su#cient to specify or disambiguate them (Veneziano '%%').
The detailed analysis of  the elements verbalized during pretend play has identi-
"ed two main types of  language use, one more informative than the other :
&. LI - Low Information : These verbalizations refer to “real” (non symbolic) aspects 
of  the play (for example, là (there) said while placing a baby doll into a toy cradle ; 
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bébé (baby) said while pretending to feed a baby doll). They can also be verbaliza-
tions referring to symbolic meanings conveyed also by the child’s ongoing actions, 
gestures and/or objects present in the situation (for example, /bwa/ boit/boire 
(drink) while pretending to feed a baby doll with an empty toy bottle).
'. HI - High information : These verbalizations decisively contribute to making 
the meanings of  pretend play accessible. This is the case when language speci!es 
the symbolic function of  an object (for example, the child says dodo (night night) 
while placing a baby doll into a toy wagon) or the symbolic identity assigned to a 
neutral object (for example, biscuit (biscuit) while bringing a piece of  paper to a 
doll’s mouth). This is even more so for verbalizations that create pretend meanings 
just by stating them (for example, when the child says, /afwa/ a froid (is cold) just 
before placing a toy quilt over a baby doll, justifying the child’s action within the 
pretend play of  putting the doll to sleep).
Analysis of  the verbalizations occurring in all the pretend play episodes of  the 
same four children, categorized according to their informative value, shows that, 
for each child, there is a point in development (varying between & ;+ and & ;&&) at 
which the child starts – and continues thereafter – to produce more often high than 
low informative verbalizations (see IVWaZ (). It is reasonable to suppose that, from 
that point on, the mentally constructed pretend meanings of  play are viewed in 
need to be highlighted and shared with the people around.
IVWaZ (. High informative language over total verbalizations in pretend play episodes, by 
child and age.
&. '. ). Developmental relations in the emergence of  di!erent “informative uses” 
of  language
;^\jgZ & plots, for each child, the appearance and early development of  the three 
early-emerging informative uses of  language discussed above. It can be seen that, 
for all the four children, the appearance of  clear and spontaneous references to 
the past and of  justi"cations appear very close in time to each other. Moreover, 
the dominant use of  informative language in pretend play co-occurs or appears 
aVc\jV\ZVcY^ciZgcVahiViZh '(
;^\jgZ &. Developmental relation between references to past, explanations/justi"cations 
and proportion of  informative language in pretend play, by child and by age.
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shortly after justi"cations and talk about the past becomes more frequent. This 
temporal convergence strengthens the interpretation, suggested by the single be-
haviors, that in the second part of  the second year children start taking into ac-
count the di!erence between their own and their partners’ state of  knowledge and 
that language can be used to provide information susceptible to bridge the gap.
These uses of  language in everyday interactional contexts seem to set the basis 
for later, more complex, behaviors. This is suggested by studies relating positive 
correlations between conversational practices like arguing in con%ictual situations 
or discussing with older siblings, and success in false belief  tasks (e.g., Dunn &..& ; 
Jenkins & Astington &..+ ; Nelson et al. '%%( ; Ru!man, Perner & Parkin &...).
&. (. Talking about internal states
It is also in the second part of  the second year that children start using words refer-
ring to internal states in the domain of  desires, physical sensations and emotional 
states, while talk about epistemic states (like think and know) is reported to appear 
in the third year (e.g., Bartsch, Wellman &..* ; Baumgartner, Devescovi, D’Amico 
'%%% ; Dunn, Bretherton, Munn &.-, ; Shatz &..)). Internal states words include 
positive but also negative emotions (like scary, hurt, sad). Moreover, children use 
these terms to refer to their own internal states before using them to talk about 
those of  others (Bretherton, Beeghly &.-' ; Brown, Dunn &..& ; Dunn et al. &.-,). 
Gradually, internal state words increase in number and their meanings become 
more di!erentiated ; moreover, they are used to talk about the causes and the con-
sequences of  behavior and to explain past and future events (Dunn et al. &.-, ; 
Wellman, Harris, Banerjee, Sinclair &..*).
&. ). Developmental relations between Talking about and taking into account 
internal states : longitudinal data
Although talking about internal states might be considered a more complex activity 
then taking into account the internal states of  others through informative uses of  
words previously acquired by the children, literature results suggest that these two 
kinds of  behaviors emerge at about the same time. In what follows we look more 
closely into the developmental relation between them through their joint analysis 
in the longitudinal study of  Camille, one of  the children whose data on informa-
tive uses of  language has been presented above.
&. ). &. The longitudinal study of  Camille : Talking about internal states
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;^\jgZ ' presents the number of  internal state (IS) words produced non imita-
tively by Camille between & ;( and & ;&% and the percentage of  IS words over the total 
number of  words produced.
It shows that the number of  IS words increases from the "rst (from & ;( to & ;*) to 
the second period (from & ;+ to & ;,.&-) and increases again in the third (from & ;- to 
& ;&%). In the "rst period the child produces only & IS word : peur (afraid) at & ;).'+). 
In the second period, she produces &* IS words, &% of  which are di!erent types, 
while in the third period '. IS are produced, '' of  which are di!erent types across 
aVc\jV\ZVcY^ciZgcVahiViZh '*
;^\jgZ '. Number of  IS words and % of  IS words over the total number of  words, per 
child’s age.
sessions. Relative to the overall vocabulary, the increase in IS words appears only 
in the second period (the percentage of  IS words increases from '% to &'%). In the 
third period, although the number of  IS words increases, their percentage relative 
to the total number of  words increases only slightly.
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Following previous categorizations (e.g., Bartsch, Wellman &..*), only slightly 
modi"ed, four types of  internal states were identi"ed :
a. physical states, referring to sensations (e.g., mal (hurt), pique (sting(s)) ; tout 
doux (soft) ; chaud (hot), froid (cold)), perceptions (vu (seen), regarde (look)) and to 
capacity (peux (can) ; peux pas (can’t)) ;
b. emotional states, like peur (afraid) and pleure (cry) ;
c. intentional states, veu(x,t) (want(s)) and veu(x,t) pas (doesn’t want) ;
d. evaluative and epistemic states : under this heading are found epistemic states 
and “evaluations”, that is, terms that refer to esthetic or functional evaluations like 
joli (nice), juste (right) and bien (good).
;^\jgZ ( shows that the "rst IS term found is an emotional state (peur (afraid)). 
&n the second and third periods the most numerous IS terms are of  the physical 
type, respectively -%% and *.% of  the IS terms produced, while emotional and 
intentional states remain at about the same level. Evaluative terms appear in the 
third period and constitute &,% of  the IS terms. No epistemic term referring to 
beliefs or knowledge is observed throughout.
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Internal state words are used for di!erent communicative functions but most of  
the times they ful"ll the informative functions of  announcing, asserting and jus-
tifying. Peur ‘afraid’, said while pointing towards the window, is used to tell the 
mother that she’s afraid of  a %y. Pleure ‘cries’ is said to her mother to tell that the 
doll she had placed in a pretend bathtub (a plastic box), cries. Pas bonne ‘not good’, 
said while handing her mother a piece of  food, justi"es the child’s action. All these 
verbalizations have in common the function of  informing the interlocutor of  as-
pects that are subjective and that can be communicated clearly through language.
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In the longitudinal study of  Camille, emotional and intentional IS terms appear 
earlier then the informative uses of  language manifesting the child’s ability to take 
into account the partners’ knowledge states (see ;^\# &). Emotional and intentional 
IS words make their "rst appearance just before & ;* and increase in the period be-
tween & ;* and & ;-, whereas the three informative uses of  language appear around 
& ;-. Evaluative terms make their appearance later, while at & ;&% still no words re-
ferring to epistemic states are observed. Thus, although both kinds of  behaviors 
occur in the second year, the developmental relation between them is at least two-
dimensional. Talking about emotional and intentional states precedes taking into ac-
count the partner’s epistemic states (knowing and beliefs) which, in turn, precedes 
;^\jgZ (. Number of  IS words per type and per child’s age.
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talking about them. One question, di#cult to answer, but that should be raised in 
this respect, is whether the emotional and intentional IS words that the child uses 
before manifesting that he takes into account the internal states of  the interlocutor 
have the same meaning of  the IS words that are used from that time on. Are they 
considered, for example, to capture subjective meanings that are not accessible 
directly to the other persons, including one’s immediate communicative partner ?
'#HijY^Zhd[aViZgYZkZadebZcih
'. &. Taking into account others’ internal states : some later manifestations
Assuredly mind-mindedness continues to develop from these early beginnings. 
Concerning the behaviors showing the ability to take into account the internal states 
of  others, from )-* years children provide the expected answers in False Belief  
tasks, showing their ability to take into account the point of  view of  a character 
without any personal involvement.
The linguistic means employed to signal the cognitive status of  a referent as 
a function of  its accessibility to the interlocutor become more varied and, from 
age ,--, can be used also in decontextualized discursive settings like the narrative 
genre. Progressively, children articulate the appropriate marking of  the status of  
information into the larger discursive organization allowing to disambiguate the 
entities talked about, their spatial placement as well as the temporal ordering of  
the events (Karmilo!-Smith &.-& ; Hickmann '%%().
'. '. Talking about internal states : some later manifestations in children’s narratives
In the same vein, also talking about internal states undergoes development. It is at 
)-* years that children start attributing mental states to the characters of  a story 
(Bokus '%%) ; Richner, Nicolopoulou '%%&), and only at around --. years that in-
ternal states are mentioned to explain behaviors (Bamberg, Damrad-Frye &..& ; 
Berman, Slobin &..) ; Charman, Shmueli-Goetz &..- ; Veneziano, Hudelot '%%.). 
It is even later that children express that di!erent characters may have di!erent 
perspectives on the same events, or that a character can have a false belief  about 
an event (Aksu-Koc, Tekdemir '%%) ; Küntay, Nakamura '%%) ; Veneziano, Hudelot 
'%%.).
In a study of  narrative development &'% children between * and && years ('% chil-
dren per age group) were asked to narrate the story they understood after seeing 
a sequence of  "ve pictures supposed to present a misunderstanding between two 
characters, best rendered by the attribution of  intentions and a false belief  to one 
of  the characters (Veneziano et al. '%%-). Analyses performed on these data for the 
present study show that the total number of  internal state words increases with 
age (F(+,&.) = ,.&&, p =.%*). Post hoc analyses using the Sche!é post hoc criterion for 
signi"cance indicate that the average number of  IS words produced by * and + 
year-olds was signi"cantly lower then that of  the . and &% year-olds, while , and - 
year-olds di!er signi"cantly only from the &% year-olds.
Concerning the type of  internal state terms used, none of  the * year-olds talks 
about epistemic states and only one + year-old refers to them. Children of  this age 
who do talk about internal states refer mostly to physical (e.g., il ne voit pas la pierre 
(he doesn’t see the stone)), emotional (il s’est fait mal (he hurt himself)) or intentio-
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;^\jgZ ). Total no. of  IS words produced and % of  children attributing at least one IS 
word, by children’s age.
nal states (il ne voulait pas (he didn’t want)). Respectively '% and &*% of  the , and 
- year-olds attribute at least one epistemic state to the characters (for example, il 
croyait qu’il avait fait exprès de le pousser (he thought he pushed him on purpose)), 
whereas at . and &% years, respectively *% and +*% of  the children do that while 
talking also about the characters’ physical, emotional and intentional states (see 
IVWaZ )).
The children of  this study were asked to tell the same story after a conversation 
where the experimenter focused the children’s attention on the reasons for the 
events depicted, without making however any explicit reference to the characters’ 
internal states. In the second narrative children make more references to internal 
states and are more numerous to attribute epistemic states to the characters (see 
;^\jgZ *).
At the ages of  * and + as many children talk about epistemic states in their se-
cond narrative as , and - year-olds do in their initial one. Similarly, in the initial 
narrative, only some . and &% year-olds attribute a false belief  to one of  the cha-
racter’s of  the story (for example, il le pousse sans faire exprès ; l’autre croit qu’il voulait 
le pousser exprès (he pushes him unintentionally ; the other one thinks he wanted to 
push him on purpose)). In the second narrative, , and - year-olds do as well as the 
older children did in their "rst narrative and also the latter become more nume-
rous to attribute a belief  and present it as false.
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IVWaZ ). Number of  internal state words produced by the children, by type, and % of  
children producing at least one of  the corresponding type of  IS words.
;^\jgZ *. Proportion of  children attributing at least one epistemic IS word and the False 
Belief, in the initial and second narrative, by children’s age.
These results show that, if  adequately focused and solicited, children reveal ca-
pacities to talk about epistemic states in monological narratives earlier then shown 
(% ZYnkZcZo^Vcd
otherwise. However, the gap between the early and the later capacities does not 
disappear, it is only displaced (Veneziano, Hudelot '%%. ; Veneziano, Albert, Martin 
'%%-).
9^hXjhh^dc
A basic understanding of  other people implies the apprehension that they are au-
tonomous beings motivated by internal psychological states such as emotions, in-
tentions and beliefs. In this paper we have distinguished two main manifestations 
of  this mind-oriented understanding : taking into account and talking about the in-
ternal states of  others, highlighting diverse manifestations of  language behaviors 
in both. Furthermore, it has been shown that these two sets of  complex behaviors 
have a long developmental history. For behaviors involving language use, both tak-
ing into account and talking about internal states start rather early in the second part 
of  the second year. We have shown that three types of  language uses – providing 
justi"cations, talking about past events and talking about the symbolic meanings 
of  pretend play –, all rendering accessible to the partner subjective experiences 
and centers of  attention, appear at about the same developmental period. The 
concomitant appearance of  these di!erent informative uses of  language takes one 
step further the suggestion based on nonverbal evidence by which taking into ac-
count the state of  knowledge of  the interlocutor starts in the second year of  life, 
before children can talk about epistemic states or provide nonverbal initial evidence 
of  “false belief ” understanding in classical scenarios (Clements, Perner &..)). The 
longitudinal study of  one child con"rms the earlier appearance of  emotional and 
intentional IS words relative to evaluative and epistemic ones. It also shows that 
informative uses of  language suggesting taking into account the partner’s epistemic 
states appear in between talking about emotional/intentional states and evalua-
tive/epistemic ones. At this developmental level these signs of  mind-mindedness 
constitute practical responses to the immediate needs arising in familiar commu-
nicative situations where children are active participants with personal interests 
and goals to pursue and where topics of  discussion bear often on context-bound 
and familiar objects and events (e.g., Karmilo!-Smith &.-& 0 Hickman '%%(). These 
behaviors, anchored to contextually-bound landmarks, are nonetheless complex 
manifestations of  mind-oriented understanding of  others and of  the di!erence 
between self  and others, and lay the basis for later developments. Several studies 
show close relationships between early conversational practices of  this type and 
success in False belief  tasks (e.g., Dunn &..& ; Jenkins, Astington &..+ ; Nelson et al. 
'%%( ; Ru!man et al. &... ; Ru!man, Slade, Crowe '%%').
Taking into account and talking about the mental world of  self  and others undergo 
development, manifesting themselves in ever more elaborated ways and at dif-
ferent levels of  awareness and distancing from the immediate context and from 
the speaker’s feelings, interests, motivations and implicit situational knowledge. 
Results of  children’s expressive capacities in monological narratives are a case in 
point. Compared to children’s behavior in natural-settings, even narratives con-
strued after causally-focused conversation, show developmental décalages. These 
developmental gaps may be due to di!erent reasons, two of  which seem particu-
larly important. One concerns self-involvement : in naturally-occurring communi-
cative contexts children have personal interest in what is happening. In storytelling 
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on request this is not the case : children tell stories about characters, most often 
"ctitious, and motivations is low. The second reason concerns the narrative genre 
itself : constructing a monological narrative is a complex activity involving com-
municative, cognitive and linguistic abilities that need to be integrated at a high 
level of  performance (e.g., Aksu-Koc, Tekdemir '%%) ; Veneziano et al. '%%-).
Starting with the understanding of  their immediate partners’ emotional and de-
sires states, of  which they provide evidence through nonverbal behaviors, children 
go on learning the words to talk about these states. Then, they use known words 
with new informative functions, and behaviors appropriate to the communicative 
needs of  the partner, manifesting that they take into account, for familiar contexts 
and topics, the di!erence in knowledge states between self  and others. It is inter-
esting to note that, in this period, we "nd only evidence suggesting that children 
view their partners as lacking knowledge or attention, but we have no indication 
that partners are seen by children as knowing something they themselves do not 
know, that is, as an informant source.
Both taking into account and talking about internal states evolve towards sophisti-
cated skills whereby linguistic and other communicative means of  increasing elab-
oration and complexity are integrated into higher-order behaviors. The capacity 
to handle self  and others’ internal states may pose new challenges when dealing 
with particular contents, interlocutors and communicative settings. An example 
of  this functional décalage can be seen in the results obtained in our narrative re-
search. Even after the conversational procedure, not all &%-years-old children could 
use beliefs to account for the characters’ behaviors. Also, a pilot study had shown 
that among the adults who had seen the images projected on a big screen in an 
amphitheatre and were asked to write the story, several produced non evaluative 
narratives. In particular situations, even adults may encounter di#culties in fully 
expressing their mind-oriented understanding.
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